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JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN TEXAS:
THE CONTEXT, CONTENT & CONSEQUENCES OF SENATE
BILL 1630
Sara A. Gordon*

INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Jimmy Martinez, a resident of San Antonio, entered the Texas criminal
justice system after missing his school bus.1 Charged with truancy and destruction of
property, Jimmy was sent to live in a county juvenile detention center for six months.2
Five months into his sentence, he was transferred to a secure state facility four hundred miles from his home and managed by the Texas Youth Commission (hereinafter
TYC) (now the Texas Juvenile Justice Department).3 While a prisoner of that facility, Jimmy witnessed his best friend’s murder and was regularly beaten and sexually
abused by TYC security guards.4 Several times during the course of his stay at the
secure state facility, Jimmy was sent to the on-site hospital for serious injuries he
sustained from the beatings.5 When pressed by Jimmy’s mother for an explanation
of why her son kept ending up in the facility’s hospital, TYC refused to answer.6
Jimmy emerged from his imprisonment battling both post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia, constantly fearful and angry, and struggling with serious bouts
of insomnia.7 When it came to answering questions about the abuse he suffered while
in TYC custody, he would at times refuse to speak at all about his experience, and at
other times would spontaneously talk for hours about it.8 Moreover, Jimmy struggled
to find and keep a job, and eventually found his way back into the criminal justice

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.A., University of Texas at
Austin, 2014. I would like to thank Professor Michele Deitch (University of Texas at Austin) for sparking my
interest in this topic, Professor Stephen Smith (University of Notre Dame Law School) for his assistance in the
development of this note, the members of the Journal of Legislation for their helpful feedback during the editing
process, and my family and friends for their ceaseless support..
1. Tim Murphy, Rick Perry’s Juvie Record, MOTHER JONES (Sep. 2011), available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/09/rick-perry-juvie-record-texas-youth-commission?page=1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Abuse and Violence in TYC Facilities, Hearing Before the Tex. Sen. Crim. Justice Comm., 2007 Leg.,
80th Sess. Interim Charge 3 (2006) (written testimony of Texas Coalition Advocating Justice for Juveniles, 4)
available at http://www.aclutx.org/files/060905%20Juvie%20Testimony.pdf.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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system after being arrested for burglary.9 He was then sent to a prison facility eight
hours away from home, where his situation was made even worse.10
Jimmy’s story is hardly atypical. For more than a century, the archetypal model
for the treatment, punishment, and supposed rehabilitation of juvenile offenders in
Texas has been mostly unchanged: confinement in large correctional facilities, much
like the one Jimmy was sent to.11 Whatever these institutions may be called—”reform
schools,” “training schools,” “youth corrections facilities,”—the institutions themselves have changed very little. 12 And in Texas, the record of these large juvenile
facilities is dismal. Dependence on them has led to consistently high recidivism rates
(for serious and non-serious offenders alike), huge costs (typically paid for through
taxpayer dollars), and alarmingly rampant violence and abuse inside the facilities, as
depicted by Jimmy’s story.13 Moreover, evidence has shown that incarceration in
these kinds of facilities has serious and lifelong negative impacts on youth.14 As
Barry Feld writes in Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court,
“[a] century of experience with training schools and youth prisons demonstrates that
they constitute the one extensively evaluated and clearly ineffective method to treat
delinquents.”15 Yet for years, no one seemed to question the state’s nearly unwavering dependence on them.
From the mid-1990s until 2007, the population of juveniles in secure state institutions dramatically increased in Texas, and corruption in these institutions became
commonplace. In late 2006, at the peak of the explosive growth in both crime and
punishment—”when about 4,800 kids were in far-flung, state-run lock-ups scattered
across the state with even more [kids] consigned to secure county-operated facilities—scandal hit.”16,17 A news story published in The Texas Observer detailed allegations of child sexual abuse by staff members from across the state (many of which
proved credible).18 In 2005, there had been similar allegations, but this particular
news story published two years later caused the scandal to truly erupt.19 Matters were
made worse when it became clear that nothing had been done to prosecute the accused in the 2005 case, but rather, there seemed to be an official cover-up of the
9. Murphy, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. RICHARD A. MENDEL & ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, THE MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE
PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (2010).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. CHILDREN AT RISK, THE STATE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS: A ROADMAP TO IMPROVED OUTCOMES IN THE TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, ADULT CERTIFICATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH, 48
(2013) available at http://childrenatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/01_The-State-of-Juvenile-Justice.pdf
[hereinafter CHILDREN AT RISK].
15. Mendel, supra note 11.
16. TEXANS CARE FOR CHILDREN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS: WHERE WE’VE BEEN, WHERE WE’RE
HEADED (2012) [hereinafter TEXANS CARE FOR CHILDREN].
17. This figure does not take into consideration the juveniles in Texas who end up being certified to the
criminal justice system and tried as adults.
18. Nate Blakeslee, Hidden in Plain Sight, THE TEXAS OBSERVER (February 23, 2007), available at
http://www.texasobserver.org/hidden-in-plain-sight/.
19. Id.
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allegations and of the corruption itself.20 Investigations ensued, high-ranking officials resigned, and the truth of just how extensive the rampant problems in the Texas
juvenile justice system were was exposed.21
In response to the scandals, the juvenile justice system began the long process of
overhauling much of the TYC management, moving juvenile offenders out of the
secure state facilities, and striving to create a system in its place more focused on
keeping them in community-based alternatives, void of corruption and designed to
rehabilitate. The dramatic shift in policy that resulted came in reaction not only to
various scandals that erupted all over the state, but also to a statewide recognition of
the drawbacks to state institutionalization and the benefits of community-based and
individualized treatment programs. Since 2007, there has been consistent advocacy
and reform efforts aimed at ensuring juvenile offenders would be treated and rehabilitated in community-based centers rather than sent away to secure state facilities.22
These reform efforts eventually led to the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 1630 by
the 82nd Texas Legislature in July 2015.23 The bill’s genesis was rooted in the belief
that the juvenile justice system in place in Texas, focused on the state model, was
developed at a different time for a different day.24 As evidenced by the tumultuous
and scandal-ridden history of the Texas juvenile justice system, the passage of this
bill was a long time in the making. At the heart of the bill is a desire to place juvenile
offenders in environments that will allow them to correct and better their lives, rather
than placing them in environments riddled with abuse and harsh punishments.25
Authored by Texas Senator John Whitmire, the bill, which marks the most significant change in Texas’ juvenile justice system in years, moves the Texas Juvenile
Justice Department to a regional model that will keep youth closer to home.26 The
facilities at the regional level are mostly operated by counties instead of the state—
unlike the five high-security lockups that more resemble prisons than rehabilitation
centers.27 The bill essentially ensures that state facilities will be reserved only for
those who simply cannot be accommodated elsewhere.28
While this bill goes farther than any previous act of legislation in terms of reorienting the juvenile justice system in Texas to stand on healthier ground, in many
ways, it is simply the logical follow-up to the sweeping reforms that have been enacted in the state since 2007. Not only will the regional model created by this piece
of legislation be beneficial to the youth themselves, but it is also considerably more
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Tony Fabelo et al., Closer to Home: An Analysis of the State and Local Impact of the Texas Juvenile
Justice Reforms, PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, available at https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/texas-JJ-reform-closer-to-home.pdf.
23. S.B. 1630, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
24. Mike Ward, Reform Bill: Hold Fewer Juvenile Offenders in State Lockups, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(Mar. 13, 2015) http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/texas/article/Reform-bill-Hold-fewer-juvenile-offenders-in-6133197.php.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 2015 Legislative Wrap-Up and Appreciation, TEXAS CRIMINAL JUSTICE COALITION (2015).
28. Id.
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cost-efficient than the previous state model.
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the Texas juvenile justice system
to help clarify the context surrounding the passage of SB 1630. Part I will be divided
into three sections. The first will detail the Texas juvenile justice system prior to the
1990s, when, while there were some instances of mistreatment in various state-run
facilities, the system was largely properly focused on rehabilitative efforts. The second section will then detail the time period beginning in the 1990s until 2007, when,
due to dramatic spikes in the juvenile crime rate throughout the nation and especially
in Texas, the state subscribed to “tough on crime” policies that resulted in widespread
abuse, neglect, and corruption. These events in particular led to the abuses that resulted in the passing of SB 1630. Lastly, the third section will detail 2007 until 2015
and explain the scandal of 2007 and the resultant series of legislation passed in Texas
aimed at restructuring the juvenile justice system.
Part II of this Note will provide an in-depth analysis of SB 1630 by examining
its legislative history, genesis, purposes, various components, and efficacy thus far.
Part III will then compare Texas’ approach to juvenile justice under the bill to approaches taken in both Missouri, where a similar approach has been implemented and
quite effective, and Louisiana, where a similar approach has been implemented but
has not yet proven successful. Part III will conclude by predicting the probable success of SB 1630 on the Texas juvenile justice system by examining how similar legislation has played out under different approaches in both Missouri and Louisiana.
I. THE STATE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS PRIOR TO SENATE BILL 1630
A. Pre-1990s
The Texas Youth Commission (TYC) (now the Texas Juvenile Justice Department) was not always reliant on high-security, state-run lockups as a way to manage
juvenile offenders.29 Prior to the mid-1990s, the prevailing rhetoric of the Texas
juvenile justice system praised the value of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The
main differences between the Texas juvenile and adult criminal justice systems, as
outlined in the Texas Family Code and Texas Penal Code, revolve around the fact
that “the primary purpose of juvenile justice procedures is protection and rehabilitation and for adults the goal is to punish the guilty.”30 This distinction characterized
the juvenile justice system in its early years.
The differences in the semantics used to describe the adult and juvenile justice
systems’ processes correlate to deeper, more tangible differences between the two
systems, and understanding these differences helps to illustrate the important facets
that characterized the Texas juvenile justice system for many years.31 Some of these
differences include:
29. CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 14.
30. Ruby Shaw & Everette B. Penn, Purpose and Scope of the Texas Juvenile Justice System, JUVENILE
JUSTICE 3 (6th ed. 2007), available at http://studysites.sagepub.com/juvenilejustice6study/state/tx/Chapter%205.pdf.
31. Id.
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Juveniles are detained and adjudicated and adults are arrested and convicted; age determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the nature
of offense determines the jurisdiction of the adult court; juveniles can be
apprehended for acts that would not be criminal if they were committed by
an adult, such as smoking; juvenile court procedures are generally informal
and may be private but adult court procedures are more formal and are
open to the public. . .A juvenile who is certified as an adult cannot be sentenced to death if the crime occurred before the youth was 18 years of
age.32
As it was established, the Texas juvenile justice system, along with all juvenile
justice systems in the United States, was focused on rehabilitation and setting each
juvenile offender on a path free from future crime. Despite this well-meaning and
deeply rooted intention, the concern for safety and national trends involving spikes
in juvenile crime resulted in frequent pushes for a more intense approach to punishment, and the juvenile justice system in Texas, even prior to the mid-1990s, saw the
outbreak of many scandals and hidden injustices throughout the various secure state
institutions.33
Morales v. Turman brought much of this to light.34 Morales was a landmark federal case in which Alicia Morales and eleven other teenagers sued the Texas Youth
Council, seeking both damages and injunctive relief, for physical and mental abuse,
segregation, and neglect suffered in juvenile detention facilities.35 Moreover, Morales was a bringing a separate due process charge because previously, in the El Paso
juvenile court, she had been given no notice of charges brought against her, given no
opportunity for a court appearance, and provided no legal representation.36
In Morales, the District Court found that “constitutional rights violations were
rampant in TYC” at the time the plaintiffs live there.37 The court, in an influential
opinion authored by Judge Justice, ruled that many practices at TYC constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, in explicit violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.38 Examples of these violations included: beatings, solitary confinement, the use of chemical crowd-control devices, and the use of drugs instead of
psychotherapy as a means to control behavior.39,40
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Morales v. Turman, 326 F.Supp. 677 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
Id.
Laurie E. Jasinski, Texas Youth Commission, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION: A DIGITAL
GATEWAY TO TEXAS HISTORY (Jun. 15, 2010), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mdt35.
37. Shaw, supra note 30, at 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. It is dangerous for juveniles to rely on medication alone for behavior modification for two main reasons. First, medication alone often does not resolve any underlying issues that may have triggered the behavioral
issues in the first place. And second, drugs have the potential to heavily sedate patients or produce dangerous
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Morales led to sweeping changes in the Texas juvenile justice system by bringing to light many instances of injustice in several Texas correctional facilities.41 Reforms that followed this case included: the closings of two institutions, the elimination of corporal punishment, the elimination of segregation, increased staff and
supervision of services, the establishment of clearer policies and procedures, and a
newly adopted Student Bill of Rights.42 Additionally, specialized community-based
alternatives and treatment programs were created, TYC-operated “halfway house”
programs were founded, stricter staff requirements for TYC employees were established, many youth were transferred from institutions to foster care, and a county
assistance program was founded in order to help reduce the number of commitments
to TYC by directing a portion of state funds to youth probation services in their local
communities.43 By and large, the agency sought to lower recidivism rates, both as a
means to decrease the exorbitant expense of maintaining several state-run facilities
and to help set the once-troubled juveniles on a path to a more successful future.44
All of these reform efforts were part of the “back to basics” approach taken by
the Texas juvenile justice system. The “back to basics” philosophy emphasized
greater structure, more strictly enforced discipline, and increased accountability. The
backbone of this new philosophy was its intent to balance public safety and punishment for criminal acts with the need for rehabilitation.
The years prior to the mid-1990s exemplify the constant tension that existed
between the two philosophies of rehabilitation and punishment. Although the Texas
juvenile justice system at its founding strove to create a balance between the two
philosophies, their efforts proved idealistic. Morales v. Turman and the Texas Youth
Commission’s “back to basics” philosophy were significant in establishing refined
and more intentional practices focused on rehabilitation and on creating safer environments both at the county-level and in the secure state institutions that continued
to exist. Certain trends and policies that arose during the 1990s, however, caused the
juvenile justice system to develop many characteristics and practice remiss of any of
these measures.
B. The 1990s—2007
Despite the Texas Youth Commission’s efforts to remain focused on the rehabilitative ideal and keeping juveniles in safer environments, an extreme spike in the
national juvenile crime rate caused much of that rehabilitative ideal to be lost.45 From
the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the rate of murder committed by teenagers aged 14-

side effects.
41. William Field et al., Gatesville State School for Boys, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION: A
DIGITAL GATEWAY TO TEXAS HISTORY.
42. Id.
43. Shaw, supra note 30.
44. See generally id.
45. James Alan Fox, Trends in Juvenile Violence, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
4 (Mar. 1996), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tjvfox2.pdf.
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17 increased 172 percent.46 These national trends, already shocking, were outpaced
by the trends in Texas alone.47 In Texas, between 1988 and 1993, there was a 69
percent increase in referrals to juvenile probation for delinquent activity, and a 161
percent increase in referrals for violent offenses.48 Texas’ juvenile homicide rate was
almost twice the national rate in 1992, and there was a 285 percent increase in youth
committed to the Texas Youth Commission for violent offenses.49 The spike in violent crime during this time period triggered widespread speculation and fears about
the causes and extent of juvenile crime.50
This apparent need to point to something—anything—as the cause of such an
intense change in juvenile crime led to the popularity of the rather unfounded belief
that there had been a dramatic and fundamental transformation in child development.51 This supposed “transformation” of child development “corroded empathy
and morality, spawning a new generation of remorseless youths who were feared to
be ‘muggers, killers, and thieves.’” 52 These “remorseless youths” were also referred
to as “juvenile super-predators”—a term coined by Princeton professor John Dilulio
that the American public quickly latched onto.53
Dr. Dilulio coined the term “super-predator” “to call public attention to what he
characterized as a ‘new breed’ of offenders, ‘kids that have absolutely no respect for
human life and no sense of the future . . . [they] are stone-cold predators!’”54 The
media nearly immediately latched on to this idea, and through furthering and disseminating the discussion, society as a whole latched on too.55 In hopes of winning approval from the public during this time and in order to do what they thought would
be best for their constituents, politicians and policymakers nearly uniformly developed “tough on crime” platforms that resulted in harsher punishments and longer
sentences for juvenile offenders.56 Dr. Dilulio himself even said, speaking about the
nation as a whole: “by my estimate, we will probably need to incarcerate at least
150,000 juvenile criminals in the years just ahead. In deference to public safety, we
will have little choice but to pursue genuine get tough law-enforcement strategies
against the super-predators.”57 This statement proved prophetic.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Tony Fabelo, An Overview of Texas Juvenile Justice Population Trends and Dynamics, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL 2 (2000).
48. Texas Youth Commission, Agency Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (2010) 12, available at
http://www.tjjd.texas.gov/about/TYC_Strategic_Plan_2011_to_2015.pdf.
49. Id.
50. See generally Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredatorthreat-of-90s.html?_r=0.
51. James C. Howell, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 4 (Sage Publications, 2nd ed. 2009).
52. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) Amicus Brief 12.
53. John J. Dilulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 27 1995),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160.
54. Howell, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. See generally id.
57. Dilulio, supra note 53.
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The stories of “superpredators” drove many states, and Texas in particular, to
utilize increasingly harsh measures, foregoing the rehabilitation ideal in favor of great
dependence on juvenile facilities that resembled adult prisons featuring barbed wire,
guards, and isolated cells. The theory behind the “tough on crime” movement was
that the juveniles of America were “too far gone” and beyond the help or reform that
rehabilitation or therapy could bring. As it unsurprisingly turned out, the idea of the
“juvenile super-predator” never proved true; it was simply an unfounded myth that
grabbed hold of society, producing detrimental effects.58 Although juvenile offenders
often have some kind of mental disorder—and are sometimes genetically predisposed
to such characteristics—the idea that a new generation of children was “born evil”
was inaccurate and misleading. Despite its falsehood, the idea of the super-predator
successfully catalyzed policymakers and the public into action because “it readily
accessed the public’s hidden stereotype of the violent youth as someone who is dangerous, living in a hopeless situation and not worthy of empathy or support.”59
The extent and popularity of the resulting “tough on crime” movement cannot be
overstated. Not only was the movement prevalent at the grassroots level, with individual citizens advocating for harsher penalties for the corrupted youth, but even
presidents fought the “war on crime” too. Beginning with Nixon, presidents took action as far into their own hands as possible by consciously and actively painting a
picture of their administrations as composed of incredibly resolute “crime-fighters.”60 Indicative of the changes the Texas juvenile justice system specifically would
soon see, Nixon argued that “doubling the conviction rate in this country would do
more to cure crime in America than quadrupling the funds for [Hubert] Humphrey’s
war on poverty.”61 And over time, the model supported by various presidential administrations became so popular that tough sentences, harsher punishment, and the
resulting loss of the rehabilitative ideal became the norm.62
Almost immediately, Texas enacted legislation aimed at expanding the treatment of juveniles as adults (for purposes of both sentencing and punishment) and
imposing determinate sentences and mandatory minimum periods of incarceration
for juveniles convicted of certain violent or serious crimes.63 Texas also modified its
laws to make easier the process of certifying juveniles to the adult criminal system—
meaning that juvenile offenders were being subjected to regimes that were originally
conceived specifically for adults.64 The laws passed in Texas during the 1990s monumentally expanded the punishments imposed on juveniles and transformed the ju-

58. Haberman, supra note 50.
59. Kenneth A. Dodge, Framing Public Policy and Prevention of Chronic Violence in American Youths,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH (7th ed.).
60. Gary Cohen, Punishment and Rehabilitation: A Brief History of the Texas Prison System, 75 Tex. B.J.
604, 605 (2012).
61. Benjamin Jealous et al., The Root: We Can’t Afford to Not Fix Justice, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 7,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/07/135203031/the-root-we-cant-afford-to-not-fix-justice-system.
62. Id.
63. Cohen, supra note 60.
64. Shaw, supra note 30.
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venile justice system into one quite different from its rehabilitation-focused predecessor. Much of what had been established by Morales v. Turman and in various
community-based rehabilitation centers across the state was replaced with an everincreasing number of state-run confinement facilities housing an also ever-increasing
number of juveniles. During this time, the population of juveniles in state-run lockups in Texas reached more than 5,000.65
Much of the reform that both the national “tough on crime” movement and the
specific work of the Texas legislature brought about was not initially intended to
drastically affect juvenile offenders in the way that it ultimately did. The collective
turning of a blind eye away from a more holistic approach to handling juvenile crime
had grave and dramatic consequences.66 Although there was a pervasive obsession
with the idea of the juvenile “super-predators,” the reforms were directed at the criminal justice system, not specifically the juvenile justice system.67 However, in light
of the process of certification, which involves juveniles being certified as adults and
their cases being moved to the adult criminal justice system, the effects of the “get
tough” reforms trickled down to the juvenile justice system.68
The sharp increase in crime eventually tapered off (as was to be expected from
the cyclical nature of crime rates), but the effects that the response to such an increase
had on the juvenile justice system were much more enduring.69 The reduction in
crime rates did not correlate to a cessation of “tough on crime” policies in Texas. In
many ways, the response that Texas took to juvenile crime demonstrates how damaging a reliance on a metric as fragile as crime rates can be—especially when that
response included a use of secure state facilities, institutions on which a surfeit of
evidence and research existed illustrating their damaging effects. Although the state
of Texas, at the time, had arguably legitimate reasons for believing that becoming
tougher on juvenile offenders would be successful, the reforms that the state made
during the 1990s erupted in a juvenile just system wrought with injustice and corruption.
The “tough on crime” policies ultimately resulted in a Texas juvenile justice system that failed. It failed citizens who could no longer rely on the security of the facilities, it failed youth by not equipping them with the skills needed to turn from a
life of crime toward becoming responsible, productive citizens, and it even failed
taxpayers, by essentially training far too many youth to become hardened criminals—
ultimately costing taxpayers as juveniles go through a revolving door in the juvenile
system and ultimately ‘graduate’ to adult prisons. The state’s response for over a
decade was, sadly, static. It primarily featured confinement in large correctional facilities operated under a punitive system rather than a supportive, rehabilitative one.

65. Maurice Chammah, Closing Corsicana: Lessons from a Juvenile Lock-Up, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Feb.
12, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/02/12/corsicana-closure-lessons-juvenile-lock-/.
66. See generally id.
67. There had been an increase in crime rate among adult offenders as well.
68. Certifying juveniles as adults to be tried in the criminal justice system is a vast topic, complicated with
both moral and political considerations. A complete discussion of the process is beyond the scope of this Note.
69. See generally Cohen, supra note 60.
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The harsher and longer sentences enacted as a result of the reforms previously discussed consequently produced a system far too dependent on punishment and far too
apathetic about understanding the root causes of crime, entrenched in the individual
situations of the juvenile offenders themselves. The “tough on crime” movement
caused two significant expansions. First, there was an expansion of opportunities to
transfer youth to adult court (and therefore to adult prisons and jails) through certification. Second, there was an expansion in the construction and use of state-run secure
confinement facilities for juveniles who would not be charged as adults.
Despite its widespread support throughout Texas, juvenile incarceration was
both unwarranted and ineffective.70 “[O]verwhelming evidence [shows] that wholesale incarceration of juvenile offenders is a counterproductive public policy.”71 Secure state facilities are often dangerous, ineffective, unnecessary, obsolete, wasteful,
and inadequate, and institutionalization in general has the likely potential of “[harming] the well-being and [dampening] the future prospects” of the majority of juvenile
offenders.72 Much of this has to do with the actual conditions of the facilities—over
time, the facilities have become “exceedingly difficult to operate in a consistently
safe and humane fashion.”73 Most significantly, the actual outcomes of correctional
confinement are shockingly poor. Juveniles are often released back into the public as
troubled as they were when they first entered confinement.74
Although there is a clear public safety need for some kind of confinement, especially for those juveniles who have committed more serious crimes, the drawbacks
and damaging consequences of Texas’ heavy reliance on secure state facilities are
difficult to ignore. Poor conditions and high rates of recidivism aside, arguably the
central concern raised by dependence on secure state facilities is how such dependence undermines the very purpose of a juvenile justice system.
The juvenile justice system was founded on the concept of rehabilitation through
individualized justice.75 Its existence—its theoretical distinction from the adult criminal justice system—rests on the idea that there is an inherent difference between a
juvenile who commits a crime and an adult who commits a crime. While root causes
of criminality may align, society has historically treated juvenile offenders as somehow “different” from adult offenders for various reasons.76 The very age of juvenile
offenders causes their cases to be even more subjective than an adult offender’s situation might be. For instance, the brains of juveniles are not yet fully developed.77

70. Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, THE ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUNDATION 3 (2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED527944.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 3.
75. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Juvenile Justice: A Century of Change in 1999 NAT’L REPORT SERIES: JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN, (Dec. 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9912_2/juv1.html.
76. Id.
77. National Institute of Mental Health, The Teen Brain: Still Under Construction, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES (2011), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-teen-brain-stillunder-construction/teen-brain_141903.pdf.
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Juvenile brains lack the ability to regulate their own emotions, and they are still undergoing changes to both their brain structure and their neural circuits.78 While juveniles’ cognitive functioning is similar to adults, their emotional development is not,
and a stressful and terrifying experience—such as incarceration—is more difficult
for them to process and bear than it would be for a normal-functioning adult.79 Therefore, not only are juvenile offenders traumatized and oftentimes physically hurt as a
result of incarceration, but they frequently are damaging mental consequences as
well.80
Moreover, as a juvenile offender’s delinquency is often caused or triggered by a
situation or condition unique to him or her, there is inherent value in responding to
those situations and conditions on a more individualized basis than secure state institutionalization allows. Another cause of criminality that would be better treated on
an individualized basis is mental disorder. Incarceration in secure state facilities can
have even more severe effects on a juvenile when he or she is mentally ill, a condition
unfortunately quite common among juvenile offenders.81 While the presence of a
mental disorder rarely provides a complete explanation of criminality, it is oftentimes
a factor to be considered when trying to understand the root causes of a juvenile offender’s criminal activity.82
Until recent reform in Texas, the manner in which the juvenile justice system
dealt with mental disorders was alarming, and is illustrative of many of the troubling
issues that plagued the system for years. In an article entitled “Repeat Offenses in
Texas Raise Questions over Release of Mentally Ill Juveniles,” The Associated Press
discusses two unique and disturbing situations.83 One of the cases involves a sixteenyear-old former juvenile detainee who was accused of stabbing a high school teacher
to death with a butcher knife, and the other case involves a teenager who was convicted of killing a roofer during a robbery spree.84 Both offenders were released by
the Texas Youth Commission because the agency was simply unable to treat their
mental illness, and as required by law, forced to let them go.85
As the article explains, “under a 1997 law meant to keep mentally ill juveniles
from being held in detention centers where they cannot get proper treatment, youths
in Texas who are serving indeterminate sentences and who have completed their minimum required time in custody are released to parents or guardians.”86 While it was
arguably laudable for the Texas juvenile justice system to disallow such offenders to
be housed in facilities where they cannot receive treatment, it seems illogical to
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merely release juveniles who are troubled and ill back into society. There were no
requirements for supervision upon release, and the Texas Youth Commission’s only
option was to merely “recommend” that the juveniles receive treatment, and to refer
them to their local Mental Health and Mental Retardation centers.87 They had no
power to enforce such a recommendation, however.88 Although this law has since
been changed, it represents the extent of not only the necessity for programs and
services that are primarily dedicated to juvenile offenders and strictly focused on rehabilitation, but also the dearth of options supporting rehabilitation that existed during this era of Texas history.
The severe rise in juvenile crime and consequent intensifying of policies focused
on punishment led to a dependence on state-run facilities in Texas unmatched by any
other state and by any other time period in Texas history. Increasing punitive
measures failed to reduce criminal recidivism in the way that many thought it might,
and instead led to a rapidly growing correctional system that strained government
budgets, exploited taxpayer dollars, and worsened the conditions and lives of countless Texas youth.
While problems were by no means completely overlooked or accepted as unchangeable, throughout the course of the 1990s and into the early 2000s there was no
unified rallying force advocating for juvenile justice. The “tough on crime” movement was not nearly as polarizing as it seems it should have been in hindsight, and it
was not until the mid-2000s that the voices of family and youth advocates speaking
out against the use of secure state facilities were finally heard. Simultaneously sparking and reinforcing their pleas for justice was the uncovering of various scandals
associated with the Texas Youth Commission that rendered the problems associated
with the juvenile justice system impossible to ignore.
A news story published by The Texas Observer hit the stands on February 23rd,
2007 which detailed serious allegations of child sexual abuse by staff members in
various secure state institutions. The story set the wheels in motion for deeply concerned parents, youth and family advocates, and legislators across the state to begin
the long process of voicing their concerns in hopes of bringing about much-needed
reform.89 This particular news story ignited an upheaval of similar allegations (many
of which proved to be true) from across the state.
Journalists uncovered that in 2005, there had been sexual assault allegations at
West Texas State School, but they were quickly covered up and no actions were taken
to prosecute the accused.90 The Texas Observer news story explains how, following
an investigation by the Texas Rangers and the FBI in early 2005, two of the highestranking officials at that school—the assistant superintendent and the principal—were
accused of having sexual relations with several students over an extended period of
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time.91 At the time, “both men denied the allegations, but investigators collected dozens of statements from students and staff, conducted polygraph tests on students, and
collected DNA samples.”92 The two men had already resigned from their positions
at the time The Texas Observer article was released, but then-current Director of the
Texas Youth Commission was accused of helping cover up the scandals, along with
several other high-ranking employees.93 The Texas Observer, however, obtained records proving that the abuse was real, based on “internal agency documents [that] describe in considerable detail numerous incidents of sexual misconduct that Texas
Youth Commission administrators were able to confirm at the facility.”94,95
Thorough investigations at various state schools and the Texas Youth Commission itself ensued. Many of these investigations resulted in a “torrent of revelations.”96 Simply stated, the original West Texas State School scandal of 2007 shed
light on countless other issues that had silently plagued the juvenile justice system in
Texas for years.97 The seriousness of the allegations against the Texas Youth Commission, the fact that most of the allegations proved true, and the fact that it resulted
in such a collective and purposeful unification of people concerned about the state of
the Texas juvenile justice system meant that Texas needed to respond in a serious
manner. To simply fire and hire new leaders at the Texas Youth Commission would
have disappointed many and presumably would not have solved any real issues. The
scandals would have to—and did—lead to a much-needed uprooting of the juvenile
justice status quo. The key characteristic of the many changes that took place in response to the Texas Youth Commission scandals was the shift in focus to keeping
juvenile offenders in their communities, and to the extent that they had to be held in
secure confinement, those institutions would be more purposefully designed to both
confine and rehabilitate them.98 These shifts alone represented a monumental change
from the focus on punishment and institutionalization that had dominated Texas since
the mid-1990s, and they demonstrated a collective recognition that the system in
place was quite dangerous to juvenile offenders.99
C. 2007-2015
The brunt of the statutory changes from 2007 until 2015 came in the form of
juvenile justice-related legislation passed in 2007, 2009, and 2011 during three consecutive Texas legislative sessions.100 The legislation passed during these three years
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led to the current juvenile justice climate in Texas and to the major reform movement
that occurred most recently in 2015. Much of the reform was grounded in ideas encapsulated by Governor of Texas Rick Perry’s statement in 2007: “I believe we can
take an approach to crime that is both tough and smart. . . [T]here are thousands of
non-violent offenders in the system whose futures we cannot ignore. Let’s focus more
resources on rehabilitating those offenders so we can ultimately spend less money
locking them up again.”101 By and large, Texas slowly but surely realized how much
more could be done to make juvenile justice more ethical and effective.
The first of the major statutory changes was Senate Bill (SB) 103 passed during
the 83rd Texas Legislature in 2007 soon after details of the Texas Youth Commission
scandals first broke.102 “Juvenile Justice in Texas: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re
Headed” explains that, broadly speaking, the statutory reforms that Texas has passed
since 2007 have “sought to ensure smaller populations, fewer abuses and better treatment at lock-ups; to give children and teens fair hearings, sentences and representation in court; and to increase the focus on community-based treatment rather than
state-administered incarceration.”103 SB 103 epitomized this most directly. It was an
omnibus reform bill with three major goals: to address the abuse in state-run institutions, to better the conditions and lower the populations in those institutions, and to
move the state toward a community-based treatment model.104 In order to address the
abuse in the secure state institutions, the bill called for a required additional 220 hours
of training for officers working in the institutions.105 Additionally, the Office of Inspector General and the Office of Independent Ombudsman were created to increase
oversight of the institutions throughout the state.106 And lastly, a new advisory board
was founded and its leadership structure was modified in order to ensure greater accountability and communication between each level of every institution and the
state.107
In order to better the conditions for juveniles and to lower the populations in
secure state institutions, the reform called for the segregation of children based on
age and crime.108 It also stipulated that only juvenile offenders who committed felonies could be committed to the Texas Youth Commission facilities, and juveniles
who were charged with misdemeanors would be diverted to county-operated programs and services.109 Prior to this reform bill, countless juveniles were sent to secure
state institutions even though they were nonviolent and had only committed misdemeanors.110 SB 103 also stipulated that juveniles nineteen years and older would “age
101. Tex. H. Rick Perry, House Journal, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. 324 (Feb. 6, 2007) (statement of Governor
Rick Perry) (emphasis added) House Journal of the Regular Session of the Eightieth Legislature (2007), available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/govdocs/Rick%20Perry/2007/SOS_Perry_2007.pdf.
102. S.B. 103, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
103. TEXANS CARE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 16.
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out” of Texas Youth Commission facilities, either through probation or by transfer to
adult prisons.111 As a result of the third main goal of SB 103—to move toward a more
community-based treatment model—the use of community-based alternatives for juvenile offenders increased.112 This led to the expansion of county-based programs for
both misdemeanants and felons in many of Texas’ largest counties.113
The second wave of legislative reform aimed at helping and bettering the juvenile
justice system came in 2009. The General Appropriations Bill led the state toward a
community-based treatment model by creating additional grant programs that would
provide incentives to keep youth in their community.114 The Legislature created financial incentives in order to influence the prevalence and success of programs and
services offered at the county level—as will be discussed shortly.115 Also in 2009,
House Bill (HB) 3689 sought to better the conditions of secure state institutions
through measures such as improving the mental health services that the Texas Youth
Commission had to offer, by supporting reading programs for Texas Youth Commission students, and also by taking appropriate steps to improve the transition for juveniles reentering their communities.116 2009 also saw SB 1374, which established a
pilot program as an alternative for nonviolent juvenile offenders.117 This was part of
an effort to move toward sentencing, remediation, and representation that were more
appropriate for the age of the offender and the crime he or she committed. Along the
same lines, HB 1793 mandated that juvenile judges receive specific training, and SB
518 sought to reduce the number of juveniles sent to adult court and to ensure that
juveniles were receiving due process and treatment that fit their age and crime.118
The legislation passed in 2011 served to both further and strengthen past juvenile justice legislation. Major reforms during the 2011 legislative session included:
more piloting of community-based treatment models, continuing the move toward
more appropriate sentencing and remediation for juveniles, enhancing accountability,
and streamlining administration. As part of the pilot program to develop more (and
improved) community-based treatment models, HB 35 extended an already existing
community pilot program designed to help children who were at risk of being placed
in the child welfare or juvenile justice systems.119 To enhance accountability among
the different branches and administrations of the Texas Youth Commission, SB 501
served to create an interagency council that addressed racial, ethnic, and regional
disparities across state agencies that serve children.120 This was in response to several
youth advocacy programs and lobbyists.
which juveniles were sent to secure state institutions and which ones were kept in less intense and harmful
environments in their communities in programs more focused on rehabilitation.
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Without question, the most significant juvenile justice bill in 2011 was SB 653.
This bill created the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD), which is still in place
today, through the merging of two different agencies—the Texas Youth Commission
and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission.121 This was not simply a renaming;
it was the replacement of a broken, scandal-ridden system with one more progressive
and ethical in both philosophy and action. SB 653 charged the newly formed TJJD
with forming programs that would help detect delinquency earlier on in future offenders.122 The TJJD was also charged with working to ensure that fewer kids who
come into contact with the juvenile justice system are incarcerated, children who remain at home are given the opportunity to enter programs designed to help them
avoid delinquency in the future, children who are incarcerated at the county level are
kept close to their community, and children who must be sent to secure state institutions have opportunities for rehabilitation.123 As its website explains:
The Texas Juvenile Justice Department has a vision of providing safety for
citizens of the State of Texas through partnership with communities and
the delivery of a continuum of services and programs to help youth enrich
and value their lives and the community by focusing on accountability of
their actions and planning for a successful future.124
County probation departments and courts are the backbone of the TJJD. All juveniles who are referred to juvenile courts have services provided to them by probation departments operated by the counties.125 As the TJJD website explains, “county
juvenile probation departments handle most of the sanctions and therapeutic interventions the courts may impose.”126 This represents the greater role that communities, and programs and institutions at the county-level in general, began to play as a
result of the statutory changes. Deborah Fowler explains in “A True Texas Miracle”
how the bill creating the TJJD prioritizes the use of community-based or familybased programs and services for youth “over the placement or commitment of youth
to a secure facility.”127 Moreover, it ensures that secure state facilities—that continue
to exist “for youthful offenders that cannot be safely served in another setting” are
more rehabilitative in nature than they were in the past.128
The creation of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department helped lead to more
streamlined efforts to keep youth in their communities. SB 653 required that the TJJD
struck a balance between the interests of rehabilitative needs and public safety and
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created funding priorities without incentivizing incarceration.129 SB 653 also worked
toward “[codifying] mechanisms to address juvenile infractions” that utilized the
community-based alternatives more so than secure state institutions.130 Although, in
all of these statutory reforms, the focus was on increasing the amount and quality of
community-based rehabilitative institutions, SB 653 also laid out the goals and
frameworks for smaller state-run lock-up facilities so that they would better promote
youth rehabilitation than they had in the past. Lastly, SB 653 created additional grant
programs that provided a financial incentive for counties to house and treat juvenile
offenders in their communities.131
As legislation such as SB 103 redirected juvenile offenders from state institutions
to their communities, greater pressure fell on the individual counties to fund programs
and institutions for the juveniles. All of a sudden, counties across the state had more
juvenile offenders that they were responsible for and not enough resources to devote
to their accommodation and rehabilitation. As “No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration” explains, in most states, “commitments to state custody are funded entirely with state funds, whereas local jurisdictions must foot the
bill for community-based supervision and treatment programs.”132 This is not exactly
true in Texas, where county programs are funded through a combination of state and
local funds. Despite this, it is still cheaper for juveniles to be sent to state facilities.133
Judges were often forced to make “an untenable choice between probation or incarceration for adolescents with moderately serious offending histories who do not pose
an immediate or significant threat to public safety.”134 For years, community-based
rehabilitation was not a legitimate or feasible option for some youth. In light of the
many statutory changes aimed at shifting more juveniles to communities instead of
to state institutions, it became imperative for the state to eliminate the financial incentives that encouraged an overreliance on state institutionalization.
As previously mentioned, a series of legislative initiatives shifted funds toward
the counties, creating less of a financial disincentive for them to keep more juvenile
offenders in their communities in non-residential programs or in rehabilitation-focused institutions, rather than send them to state correctional facilities.135 As Marc
Levin and Jeanette Moll explain in “Comprehensive Juvenile Justice Reform: Cutting
Costs, Saving Lives,” the Texas Legislature included a rider in the budget in 2009
that “authorized the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (TJPC) to fund grants to
local juvenile probation departments that pledged to reduce commitments to TYC
through the diversion of suitable juvenile offenders to community-based treatment
and vocational programs.”136 These programs were required—by statute—to cost
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less than half of the per-day cost of state lockups.137 Additionally, the law was written
so that these programs were only funded if evidence from other jurisdictions using
similar approaches was positive and ongoing results from the Texas programs themselves demonstrated an overall reduction in recidivism.138
Fortifying the statutory changes and financial incentives for courts and correctional systems to keep juvenile offenders in their communities was a statewide
change in personal and public mindsets toward juvenile crime.139 Although the 2007
Texas Youth Commission scandals served as the impetus for change to occur, people
quickly saw the many dangers and drawbacks to incarcerating juveniles in secure
state institutions—with the stories behind the scandals serving as their main source
of information. People came to see that “the case against juvenile correction facilities
is overwhelming. Countless studies and decades of experience show that these institutions are both dangerous and ineffective.”140 While this certainly is not true for
every secure state institution in the country—nor should state institutions automatically be labeled as “dangerous” or entirely punitive—there are benefits to community-based rehabilitation programs that Texas as a whole has consistently acknowledged and acted upon in recent years. This genuine change in mindset reinforced the
changes in legislation and finances that have been occurring since 2007. During this
time, remembering the jagged and complex history of the juvenile justice system in
Texas became helpful to legislators, advocates, and even parents of juvenile offenders. The 2007 Texas Youth Commission scandals caused people to realize the downward spiral that the juvenile justice system has been on since the mid-1990s and, not
only that, but to take action to reform the system to one more closely identified with
its roots.141 In “Right on Crime: The Texas Model – Part II,” an article written by
Stephen Lilienthal, Levin is quoted saying, “current reform efforts are returning us
to policies that are more consistent with the history of the United States.”142 In this
statement, Levin is referring to the rehabilitation model that Texas more or less honored until the mid-1990s (and the ensuing crime explosion and “tough on crime”
movements that have been discussed).143 His statement highlights the cyclic nature
of Texas’ juvenile justice system. The statutory changes and the shift in financial
incentives would arguably not have occurred if advocates, parents, legislators, and
others had not genuinely believed in the necessity for state and local courts and correction systems to invest in and expand access to intensive and high-quality alternatives to incarceration.
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II. A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT TEXAS SENATE BILL 1630
The advocacy and legislative efforts to address the corruption and dysfunction
in the Texas Juvenile Justice Department eventually culminated in the passage of
Senate Bill (SB) 1630.144 This bill solidified into law what so much of the drastic
reform movements in Texas since 2007 had been leading to. SB 1630 focuses on
shifting the entire Texas juvenile justice system away from the century-old “state
model,” designed to place serious and non-serious offenders alike in high-security,
state-run lockups, to a “regional model,” in which juvenile offenders are kept, when
possible, in community-based facilities closer to their homes, in an environment focused on their rehabilitation.145 The bill relies heavily on a 2015 report created by the
Council of State Governments Justice Center finding that system-involved youth detained within their communities have better outcomes than youth sent to distant,
state-run juvenile justice facilities.
SB 1630 requires the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to develop a
plan for juvenile probation departments across the state to keep youth in regional
facilities rather than committing them to TJJD facilities.146 Under the new model,
youths will only be sent to state facilities if resources in their community cannot meet
their needs.147 Essentially, the bill ensures that local juvenile probation departments
continue to effectively serve youth, making it a requirement for the probation department to use risk- and needs-assessments on youth immediately upon their entrance
into the juvenile justice system.148 This means that each youth will be given the individualized focus and attention that he or she needs in order to become successfully
rehabilitated and not prone to recidivism. The overarching requirement of this bill is
for the success of the juvenile justice system “to be measured not only by the number
of youth who reoffend but also by various factors indicative of youths’ well-being,
such as family and community engagement.”149
To make this more feasible, the bill expands the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Independent Ombudsman (OIO), an external advocate for the rights of youth in custody.150 The expansion of this office will help address the great number of youth that
will be held at the county level and ensure that there is greater oversight in the switch
to this regional model.151 The bill would allow the OIO to investigate any complaints
alleging that the rights of youths committed to post-adjudication facilities for juvenile
offenders were being violated.152 The bill stems from two major trends: 1) all the
corruption and resulting advocacy for change, and 2) the consistent and convincing
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research that it would be far more effective to keep juvenile offenders in their communities than in state-run institutions.
Under the new regionalization plan proffered by SB 1630, each region would be
required to operate defined, appropriate, research-based programs for youth.153 TJJD
is required to consult with juvenile probation departments to identify capacity at postadjudication facilities operated by juvenile probation departments, counties, or private operators that could help support the regionalization plan.154 That reorganization
plan includes a budget review, redirection of staff, and funding mechanisms needed
to support the plan.155 TJJD is even required to create a brand new division to administer the regionalization plan, monitor program accountability, and perform other
functions, such as providing training, assisting in research-based program development, and analyzing TJJD data in order to provide clear guidance to local probation
departments on outcome measures.156
One of the most major obstacles in supporting such a dramatic overhaul of the
status quo is the issue of funding. SB 1630 addresses this issue too, however, by
establishing a probation funding formula.157 Prior to SB 1630, TJJD was required to
allocate annually state aid funds to juvenile boards to provide juvenile services. SB
1630 requires TJJD to use the new formula for this purpose, with the intention of
allotting as much money as is needed to ensure that the goals of SB 1630 can become
a reality.158 The bill would also allow the Legislature to appropriate funds to initiate
the regionalization plan in a way that actually generated savings to the state through
a decreased population of youth detained in TJJD-operated secure facilities.159 Further, TJJD would have to set aside a portion of its discretionary state aid appropriations in order to fund projects with established recidivism reduction goals dedicated
to serving specific populations based on risk and needs.160 Lastly, TJJD would reimburse counties for the placement of youth under the regionalization plan at a rate that,
again, would offer savings to the state compared with the relative cost for detaining
a juvenile at a secure facility.161
Simply stated, SB 1630 would continue the successful reforms that the state of
Texas has undertaken in its juvenile justice system over the past several years by
ensuring that juveniles are sent to appropriate and safe programs where they will
undergo treatment designed to help rehabilitate them rather than strictly punish them.
By keeping juveniles closer to their communities, by increasing oversight, and by
appropriating sufficient funds, Texas, through SB 1630 aims protect a vulnerable and
large subset of its population and complete and maintain the successful reform of the
juvenile justice system.
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III. COMPARING AND ANALYZING ‘THE TEXAS APPROACH’
Given the comprehensiveness and progressive nature of SB 1630, the Texas approach to juvenile justice seems unquestionably commendable and on the fast track
to success. The bill not only passed during the summer of 2015, which was an accomplishment in and of itself, but it received a great deal of praise across the board
from families of juvenile offenders, legislators, various advocacy groups, and taxpayers. Adjudging Texas’ true success in the realm of juvenile justice reform, however, entails not only comparing its present state to the corruption-riddled and punishment-obsessed past, but also comparing the state’s efforts with that of other states.
Much of the reform initiated in Texas was modeled on reform that was—and
is—in the process of occurring in Missouri.162 Similar to Texas, Missouri’s juvenile
justice system took a turn for the worst in the mid-1990s as a result of escalating
juvenile crime around the country and the subsequent explosive “tough on crime”
reaction.163 But the state of Missouri, through an intense and still ongoing process of
reform, “has created a juvenile justice system that has proved so successful over the
last thirty years it is known as the ‘Missouri Miracle.’”164 Nearly thirty years ago,
Missouri closed its training schools and, since then, the state’s Youth Corrections
Agency has consistently produced better outcomes in the state than ever before, all
without breaking the state’s budget.165 Similar to Texas, Missouri went about this
process focused on offering a more humane, constructive, and positive approach to
juvenile justice.166 Its system, impressively unique and progressive at the time (and
still), is made up of small facilities, designed to hold between ten and thirty juveniles,
located at sites throughout the state that keep young people close to their own
homes.167 The facilities themselves are a far cry from the isolation rooms the state
used to heavily rely on, and are now more group-focused and staffed by highly trained
and educated individuals who treat the juveniles with respect and dignity.168 The results Missouri has witnessed speak for themselves: “fewer than 8 percent of the
youths in the Missouri system return against after their lease, and fewer than 8 percent
go on to adult prison.”169 Further, “one-third of the youths return to their communities
with a high school diploma or GED, and another fifty percent successfully return to
school.”170 Missouri continues to see such impressive results today.
The crux of reform in Missouri—switching to the community-based alternative
system rather than sending juveniles to far-flung state lock-ups—was the main source
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of influence that the state had on Texas. SB 1630 made the Missouri approach to
juvenile justice reform more of a reality in Texas by making it law that the default
location for the vast majority of juvenile offenders would be community-based alternative facilities rather than state institutions. And the success that Missouri has had
thus far in reducing recidivism and avoiding the corruption that so easily attaches to
secure state institutions can thus serve as an indication of the probable success that
the Texas juvenile justice system is likely to experience as well.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Louisiana juvenile justice system remains entrenched in the corruption-riddled and punishment-obsessed form that
Texas, Missouri, and other states have strived so hard to escape.171 Similar to Texas
and Missouri, and many other states following the nationwide “tough on crime”
movement, before any reform efforts were considered in Louisiana, the reality of the
situation in juvenile institutions across the state was as dire as one can imagine.172
Regular reports of “gladiator-style fighting, guards molesting children, and a lack of
basic education for kids as young as 14” gave Louisiana’s juvenile justice system the
reputation as one of the worst in the country.173 Like Texas, the state had its work cut
out for it, when, in 2003, the Louisiana Legislature passed sweeping reforms aimed
at restructuring the juvenile justice system and transforming it into one that resembles
the Texas system under SB 1630. Again like Texas, Louisiana’s intent was to whittle
down the number of juveniles locked in sprawling, prison-like facilities and instead
switch to relying on community-based services in order to help target the root causes
of juvenile delinquency.
On paper, Louisiana’s plan sounded promising and in tune with the reforms of
its neighboring states who similarly had great need for an improved juvenile justice
system. The Louisiana approach, compared with Missouri and Texas, however,
proved too idealistic for the support and resources that were actually granted to it.
Simply stated, while the reforms were commendable in theory, the state of Louisiana
did not invest enough of its resources into the reformed, alternative methods of rehabilitating juvenile offenders.174 And to make matters worse, the state actually began
building even more prison-like facilities following the legislation.175 Further, for the
community-based alternatives that had enough resources to remain open, the conditions there were not much better than the conditions in the prison-like, state-run facilities. Despite the intentional focus on rehabilitation, the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice provided inadequate monitoring of the community-based alternative
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facilities.176 The forty-four facilities are not managed by the same organization, resulting in no uniform oversight or monitoring system.177 This has resulted in inefficiency and abuse. While more juveniles have been sent to those alternative facilities
than ever before, the severe lack of funding and the inadequacy of oversight resulted
in an alternative option that was not actually an improvement from its predecessor.
The present situation in Louisiana is as important for Texas to acknowledge and
learn from as is the situation in Missouri, despite the great discrepancy in success
levels between the two states. This is primarily because the case of Louisiana essentially demonstrates what can potentially go wrong with reform plans of this style and
size. The two main obstacles faced by Louisiana are genuine threats to Texas, Missouri, and any other state that seeks to reform their juvenile justice systems to a rehabilitative-focused, community-based alternative method. These obstacles relate to
resources and oversight.
First, a state’s true commitment to a piece of legislation becomes completely
transparent when examining how much money is actually allotted to the furtherance
of that legislation. In Texas, local jurisdictions have funded the community-based
alternatives in a number of ways including: “state funds in the form of a line item in
the budget or grants; Medicaid funding for some behavioral health services; Workforce Investment Act dollars; grants form non-profit foundations that invest in juvenile justice; local government tax collection initiatives; and money saved from closing down juvenile facilities.”178 It is markedly more affordable to house juveniles in
community-based alternatives than in secure state institutions, but for any kind of
facility to function properly, there obviously has to be some sort of consistent and
dependable source of funding.179 Fortunately, due to the nature of services provided
by the community-based alternatives, there are several different sources of funding
available. However, so much comes down to how much the state in particular is willing to allocate. For instance, if a state is unwilling to allocate sufficient resources to
community-based alternatives, but had little hesitancy allocating funds to fully staterun lock-ups, it becomes questionable how invested the state actually is in pursuing
rehabilitation-focused, community-based alternatives. In this realm in particular,
where so much is dependent on government action, without the backing of the state,
true reform would be hard to come by.
Second, a major issue with the Louisiana system was the lack of organized oversight. The story of the Texas juvenile justice system during the mid-1990s until 2007
depicts why oversight is so critical to a juvenile justice system. Its importance in
protecting youth, enabling community involvement, monitoring and reporting on reform efforts, and fostering a legitimate and humane system cannot be overstated.
While Louisiana surely was aware of the importance of oversight in the research
compiled and considered before the passing of its reform legislation, the reality on
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the ground indicated that oversight was not a priority. While some opponents to SB
1630 in Texas argued that additional and clear oversight could perhaps be a burden,
it is a far better situation to have too much oversight than too little. The situation in
Louisiana makes that clear. The position of the OIO in the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department—an office created with the sole purpose of it allowing one person (and
his/her office) to oversee, in a uniform and strict manner) the inner workings of each
institution and facilities, is critical to achieving the kind of reform sought by Texas
and Louisiana alike.
While more and more states have successfully shifted their ideologies away from
a punishment/retribution ideal and to a more rehabilitation-focused mindset, the results have not always been promising, as indicated by the situations in Missouri and
Louisiana, two states on opposite ends of the spectrum. Because, at this point, SB
1630 is still being implemented across the state, it is not possible to conclusively
declare what its success will be, though it is possible to make informed predictions.
Because the juvenile justice system in Texas had become as corrupt and backwards
of an institution as it did during the early 2000s, legislators, policymakers, and advocates had their work cut out for them in terms of reform—more so than nearly all
other states. But SB 1630 is not the first of its kind to attempt to shift the underlying
principles of the juvenile justice system. Rather the bill is a culmination of a long
lineage of similarly focused legislation, occurring every other year since 2007. Although unfortunate in some ways that it took nearly eight years for a piece of legislation like SB 1630 to pass, its success is made even more probable by the fact that it
considers all of the legislation that the three preceding legislative sessions have produced. The two most pressing concerns for reform in this realm, resources and oversight, are more accounted for with SB 1630 than would have been possible had previous legislation not paved the way.
SB 1630 has successfully put into place a much-needed regional model that has
the potential to serve juvenile offenders better than ever before. In allowing more
youth to be closer to home, have youth receive mental or drug treatment that they
need, and maintaining a focus on safety and accountability, SB 1630 has the extreme
potential to place Texas on solid ground in terms of having a juvenile justice system
that is stable, transparent, and effective.
IV. CONCLUSION
Riddled with corruption and full of neglect, abuse, and cruel and unusual punishment, the Texas juvenile justice system reached a point where it could prolong
dramatic reform no longer. Although juveniles in the system were mistreated for
years, largely due a nationwide “tough on crime” movement catalyzed by spikes in
the national juvenile crime rate, it took until a serious scandal leaked in 2007 for
enough attention to be gained by advocates, legislators, and policymakers for any real
and lasting change to be made. In 2007, when allegations of extreme corruption and
abuse at a heavily populated Texas secure state juvenile institution proved true, the
stage was set for a series of legislation aimed at completely reforming the entire juvenile justice system from the ground up. These reform efforts culminated in Senate
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Bill 1630, which went into effect in September of 2015. This progressive bill focuses
on two main goals: first, switching the Texas juvenile justice system to a regional
model rather than a state model, wherein juvenile offenders are kept in facilities in
their communities rather than far away in prison-like state-run lock-ups, and, second,
within those facilities, placing a far greater emphasis on rehabilitation rather than on
punishment.
While it is too soon to know definitively just how successful this new model
will be, based on past experience, through examining the purpose and language of
the bill itself, and comparing the newest reform bill with efforts in different states, it
is clear that this model has a high probability of being exceptionally effective. Missouri and Louisiana are both states similar to Texas in that the histories of their juvenile justice systems are comparably filled with corruption and an extreme focus on
punishment. Of the two, however, only Missouri has actually experienced success
and a truly reformed juvenile justice system. Properly leaning on the Missouri model
and striving to avoid the mistakes made through the Louisiana model, Texas seems
to be in remarkably good shape in terms of ensuring that the progressive and wellmeaning intent behind and language of SB 1630 will be appropriately implemented
and maintained in the years to come.

